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Maps 
 
I. Map of the Habsburg Empire and its ethnic populations before its breakup in 1918. The 
German regions around Prague in the northwest corner of the map are the populations that would 
make up Czechoslovakia’s German minority.1  
 
                                                          
1 “Map of the Habsburg Empire,” Institute for Research of Expelled Germans, accessed 14 April 2016. 
http://expelledgermans.org/sudetengermans.htm 
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II. Czechoslovakia in the interwar period, showing the latter historical development of 
Czechoslovakia from the annexation of the Sudetenland to the dissolution of the state in 1992 
into today’s Czech Republic and Slovakia. The German majority regions are labeled as the 
‘Sudetenland’ on this map. 2 
 
 
                                                          
2 Dr. Paul Werth, “Czechoslovakia 1938-1939”, History 446: History of Europe since 1815 Geo-Quiz, University of 
Nevada, accessed  16 March 2016, https://faculty.unlv.edu/pwerth/466.html#geoquiz  
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III. Map of the German-speaking areas of Bohemia, Moravia, and Silesia in the majority Czech 
region of Czechoslovakia. Eger, the publishing center, and Aussig, the industrial city, are located 
in northern Bohemia.3  
  
                                                          
3 “Areas of the Czechoslovakian state founded in 1918 where the German-speaking parts of the population were a 
majority,” Multicultural Interdisciplinary Handbook, accessed 14 April 2016, 
http://grial4.usml.es/MIH/reignTerror/en/resource1.html  
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Introduction and Thesis: Sudeten German Awareness in Germany 
 In the midst of the collapse of the Austrian-Hungarian Empire at the end of World War I, 
the Czechs of Bohemia, Moravia, and Silesia in north-central Europe succeeded in founding the 
state of Czechoslovakia together with the Slovaks to their east.4 The Germans living in the Czech 
lands, however, protested the development, desiring autonomy or union with Austria or 
Germany. While tensions between the two groups simmered for much of the 1920s, the world 
economic crisis beginning in Czechoslovakia in 1930 would end what mutual Czech-German 
political toleration existed through uneven economic impact and discriminatory work projects.5 
The Nazi-influenced Sudetendeutsche Partei (SdP) captured the largest number of German votes 
in 1935 and in 1938 the SdP leader Konrad Henlein issued his Carlsbad Ultimatum, calling for 
autonomy for the German majority in the so-called Sudetenland of Czechoslovakia that would 
essentially result in an alliance with Nazi Germany. The September Crisis and the Munich 
Agreement that followed would result in German occupation of the Sudetenland and the end of 
the first Czechoslovak Republic.6 
 The period between 1929 and 1934 offers an opportunity to see how German awareness 
of the Sudeten Germans, as the Germans of Czechoslovakia were then called, changed. The 
question is relevant for the reason that enthusiasm-gap that appeared between Hitler and the 
German people in the fall of 1938. Hitler and the Nazi Party had an enormous influence on the 
SdP, as evidenced by the coordination between Hitler and the SdP in 1938 and Henlein’s flight 
into Germany before the annexation.7 Yet letters written to Hitler by ordinary Germans after the 
                                                          
4 Patrick Crowhurst, A History of Czechoslovakia Between the Wars: From Versailles to Hitler’s Invasion, (New York: 
I.B. Tauris, 2015), 18-22 
5 Václav Houžvička, Czechs and Germans 1848-2004: The Sudeten Question and the Transformation of Central 
Europe, (Prague: Karolinum Press, 2015), 148-149. 
6 Houžvička, op. cit., 246.  
7 Crowhurst, op. cit., 211-212. 
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annexation reflect more relief that war was averted than joy that the Sudeten Germans were 
joined to the German nation.8 A concern for Sudeten Germans was therefore not on the minds a 
significant, vocal part of the German population, while it very much was a concern of Hitler’s. 
Explaining this discrepancy requires examining the roots of Nazi influence in Sudeten German 
nationalism and how the Nazis built the narrative of Sudeten German suffering to necessitate 
annexation.  
 Yet the debate over the Sudetenland goes further than questions of agreement between 
Hitler and the German people at a critical moment in world history. The 1920s and 1930s 
represented complex understanding of who was German and what German responsibilities 
towards the Sudeten German people were. Discourses in Germany on German minorities abroad 
and the actions of the Nazi Party reveal both converging and diverging dialogues on how 
Germans defined themselves in the midst of changing national boundaries. Understanding how 
the Germans were aware of the Sudeten Germans allows for a more thorough examination of 
German identity before Hitler and the Nazi Party would redefine it in conquest and mass-murder. 
 The many different voices that made up this dialogue require a diverse set of sources. 
Limited to using available primary sources and only those in the German and English languages, 
this paper relies on case studies of sources, including minority magazines, encyclopedias, the 
diaries of Nazi officials, and official diplomatic communiques. Together, they provide an insight 
that points towards different ways of understanding Sudeten German awareness beyond the 
direct actions of political parties.   
 
 
                                                          
8 Letters to Hitler, ed. by Henrik Eberle and Victoria Harris, trans. by Steven Randall (London: Polity Press, 2006), 
177-183. 
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Historical Context: A New Nation and an Aborted Revolt  
In March 1919, the German-speaking people in the newly formed Republic of 
Czechoslovakia were struggling for their independence. Having identified with the Habsburg 
Empire and its imperial family during the nationalist struggles of the late nineteenth century, 
Germans saw their position within the territories of Bohemia and Moravia decline, as the 
collapse of the monarchy in November 1918 was preceded by a declaration of the new Czech 
government in Prague that October. Unlike the Germans, the Czechs were well positioned to take 
advantage of the collapse of the old Habsburg Empire. Tomáš Masaryk and his colleague Eduard 
Beneš had spent the war gaining support from the Allies for an independent Czech nation. The 
Czechs had also gained military prestige, as the Czech Legion, formed from captured Austro-
Hungarian soldiers on the eastern front, fought its way across Russia after the Russian 
Revolution and managed to return to Europe in time to take part in the military victory.9 Now, 
with control of Prague, the Czechs had the necessary ingredients for a state.  
The Germans viewed the situation very differently. The promise of Woodrow Wilson’s 
Fourteen Points and its call for self-determination for ethnic groups in Europe was denied to 
them. Not wishing to live dominated by an ethnic majority who they regarded as inferior, the 
Germans sought to join with German Austria, the region they most identified with.10 This, 
indirectly, would have meant joining with Germany. The desire for a united German nation 
among German minority populations was widespread, and not just in the ruins of the Austrian-
Hungarian Empire. Friedrich Ebert, the leader of the German Social Democratic Party and future 
                                                          
9 Crowhurst, op. cit., 18-22. 
10 Ibid., 18. 
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first democratically-elected president of Germany, opened the Weimar Constitutional 
Convention in March 1919 with a speech in which he remarked on the Austrian convention 
which called for uniting with the German Republic.11 In an address that was marked by partisan 
interruptions, he received general applause and agreement from the gathered delegates when he 
declared that “They [the Austrian Germans] belong to us and we belong to them!”12 He called on 
the Allied powers to grant the nationalist dream of a united German nation, a move that would 
have potentially united German populations in Bohemia and Moravia into the German Reich.  
But such a goal was far from the desires of the Allies. Having defeated Germany at a 
great human and economic cost over the past four years, Britain and France were not interested 
in making Germany stronger by uniting German Austria and Germany together. As for 
Czechoslovakia, Allied foreign policy experts noted that the German populations lived mainly in 
the border regions to the north, south, and west of the predominately Czech territories in 
mountainous regions that would provide natural defenses to the new state. France, seeking allies 
against a future German threat, wanted to ensure that the Czech position was as a strong as 
possible to resist German incursion.13 Even Woodrow Wilson was far from interested in building 
a German state. For him, it was vital that national and historical boundaries be maintained while 
the ethnic majorities that had been suppressed by the great land empires would be given the right 
to chart their future. The ethnic majorities would be united with the ethnic minorities in 
identifying with the nation, rather than ethnic background, to make these new central and eastern 
                                                          
11Die Deutsche Nationalversammlung im Jahre 1919 in ihrer Arbeit für den Aufbau des neuen deutschen 
Volksstaates, herausgegeben von Geh. Justizrat Prof. Dr. Ed. Heilbron, 1. Band (Berlin: Norddeutsche 
Buchdruckerei und Verlagsanstalt, 1920), 1-9. All translations unless otherwise noted are those of the author.  
12 Ibid., 6.  
13 Crowhurst, op. cit., 26. 
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European states like the United States--a loyal melting pot reveling in the joys of 
independence.14  
The Germans took exception to this vision. In an uncoordinated effort, predominately 
German regions in Czechoslovakia revolted against the new government. In northern Bohemia, a 
provisional government was declared. Germans in northern Moravia formed a territory they 
called the Sudetenland, after the mountain range that formed Czechoslovakia’s northern border. 
To the south along the German Austrian border, towns seceded from the Czechoslovak state and 
joined Austria.15 The Germans in Czechoslovakia sought to force the issue through 
independence movements of their own. But the Czechs, their own nationalist goals so nearly 
accomplished, refused to let the resistance stand in their way, dispatching the Czech army to 
quell the rebellion. Backed by arms, experience, and nationalist drive, the Czech army was far 
superior to the German resistors.16 In some areas the rebellion was quashed peaceably. Near 
Reichenberg in northern Bohemia, thirty Germans dispatched to guard a nearby mountain were 
disarmed in the middle of the night by Czech troops.17 Elsewhere, the result was far more 
violent. More than fifty Germans were killed in clashes with Czech troops. Some Germans and 
German nationalist organizations fled across the border into Austria.18 It was an inauspicious 
beginning to the Czech-German relationship. The Germans in the new Czechoslovakia lacked 
many of the state-building resources that the Czechs had: a strong, organized military force, 
centralized leadership, and, most importantly, international support. With Germany preparing for 
the Paris Peace Conference and German Austria still recovering from defeat, neither was able or 
                                                          
14 Lloyd Ambrosius, “World War I and the Paradox of Wilsonianism,” lecture at the Heidelberg Center for American 
Studies, 2 June 2016.  
15 Crowhurst, op. cit., 25-26, 56-57. 
16 Ibid., 27. 
17 Mark Cornwall, The Devil’s Wall: The Nationalist Mission of Heinz Rutha (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
2012), 101. 
18 Crowhurst, op. cit., 27.  
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willing to help the German minority in Czechoslovakia. Both the German elites and the masses 
in Germany turned a deaf ear to pleas from across the border.  
Placing the Question: The Timeframe 
How then did the abandonment of 1919 become the annexation of 1938? Most historians 
rightly point to the influence of Hitler and the Nazi Party in co-opting the German issues in 
Czechoslovakia to make territorial gains against a weakened enemy. Yet this interpretation does 
not explain alone why the Nazi government chose Czechoslovakia as a target or the enthusiasm 
gap between the Nazis and other Germans towards annexation. It also does not show how greatly 
the conversation within Germany changed after the Nazi seizure of power. The Nazis played a 
key role in redirecting the narrative in Germany about the Sudeten Germans, but it was a 
narrative that did not have everyone’s agreeance, both outside and inside the Nazi government.  
The period from 1929 to 1934 represents a period of profound change in how Sudeten 
German awareness was presented in Germany. The international Great Depression of 1929 
struck Germany and Czechoslovakia during this time, helping to cause the collapse of the 
Weimar Republic and providing the opportunity for the Nazi seizure of power in 1933. 
Czechoslovakia handled the economic decline better, but the huge impact of the Depression on 
the German territories, where the economy had not diversified and was dependent on the foreign 
export market, fueled a rise in political Sudeten German nationalism. Hitler’s rise to power 
produced a substantial backlash in Czechoslovakia, as the government arrested and prosecuted 
members of the Nazi Party in Czechoslovakia, eventually banning of the party by the end of 
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1933.19 This would help clear the way for the rise of Konrad Henlein and his Sudetendeutsches 
Heimatfront (SHF), a cultural organization that evolved into the SdP.20  
German awareness of the Sudeten Germans, their struggles, and their aspirations shapes 
our understanding of the period in many ways. It illuminates how the discourse in Germany on 
the issues of minorities in Europe, particularly those of German populations living outside 
Germany, evolved under the Weimar Republic.   The transnational nature of the Nazi Party and 
the support of the German government for Germans living abroad reveal a side of both official 
and unofficial efforts to shape German awareness of the Sudeten Germans. The Sudeten 
Germans also played a role in developing support for the Sudeten Germans still in 
Czechoslovakia. These dialogues within Germany entered into larger nationalistic narratives. 
 
Historiography: Skirting the Topic 
 Most historians who have covered the topic of the First Czechoslovak Republic in the 
interwar years have not directly covered the topic of German awareness of the Sudeten Germans, 
the lone exceptions being the German historian Rudolf Jarowski and, to a more limited extent, 
the American historian Ronald Smelser. None have considered the topic within such a limited 
timeframe, particularly one that strenuously avoids placing the end of the period in 1933, when 
Hitler took power in Germany and the Czechoslovak government intensified its campaign 
against nationalist German organizations. The work of historians on the interwar Czechoslovakia 
have presented a variety of angles to examine the issue of Sudeten German awareness in 
Germany, while not yet addressing the bridge between the Weimar Republic and Nazi Germany. 
                                                          
19 Ronald M. Smelser, The Sudeten German Problem 1933-1938: Volkstumpolitik and the Formulation of German 
Foreign Policy (Middletown: Wesleyan University, 1975), 54.   
20 J. W. Bruegel, “The Germans in Pre-War Czechoslovakia,” A History of the Czechoslovak Republic: 1918-1948 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973), 182-183. 
Siegel 12 
 
 First, a background on the conflicted nature of Czechoslovakia’s historiography would be 
in order. Milan Řepa, a Czech historian, compiled a historiography of Czech lands in his article 
“The Czechs, Germans, and Sudetenland: A Historiographical Dispute in the ‘Heart of 
Europe.’”21 Covering historians and their perspectives beginning with the Czech historian and 
politician František Palacký writing after the revolutions of 1848 and continuing through to the 
present day, Řepa casts the historiography as a question of state versus national history until 
World War II. With the onset of the Cold War, divisions between ideological and national 
perspectives emerged as exiled Czech historians and expelled Sudeten German historians in the 
West debated one another and Marxist Czech historians still working in communist 
Czechoslovakia. This led to tendencies among exiled Czech historians to seek to exonerate the 
Czechoslovak government from responsibility for the annexation, while the Sudeten German 
historians initially placed much of the blame on the Czechoslovak government.22 The 
lengthening of the Cold War and the institutionalization of studying the subject, through such 
research institutes as Collegium Carolinum in Munich, helped bridge differences between the 
historiographies, while the end of the Cold War brought rapprochement on issues of 
historiographical debate between Czech and Germans, who decided on acceptable terms for 
events, such as the Sudeten German expulsion.23 However, not all historians have agreed with 
the rapprochement, even stating that the rapprochement was merely the continuation of the 
Czech narrative in a different guise.  
 One example of the rapprochement is the collaboration between Radomír Lǔza and J.W. 
Bruegel. Luža, one of the leading early historians of the postwar period, concentrated on political 
                                                          
21 Milan Řepa, “The Czechs, Germans, and Sudetenland: Historiographical Dispute in the Heart of Europe,” 
Disputed Territories and Shared Pasts, ed. by Tibor Frank and Frank Halder (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 
316-328. 
22 Milan Řepa, op. cit., 316-317. 
23 Ibid., 316-328. 
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and economic dilemmas, using the rise of the Nazis in Czechoslovakia as a point of departure for 
talking more thoroughly about the developments of the 1930s.24 Bruegel, who contributed to a 
volume edited by Luža, wrote on the political continuities from 1920 to 1935, with anti-Nazi 
parties consistently holding majorities in the Czechoslovak Parliament until the SdP’s powerful 
showing in 1935.25 These studies began to expose uneven periods of change between 
Czechoslovakia and Germany as well as the causes of the changes that did occur, but did not 
expand their focus much beyond participation in government and subversive activities. 
Among the historians to expand upon the topics of institutionalized nationalism among 
Sudeten Germans and in Germany were Ronald Smelser and Rudolf Jarowski. Smelser sought to 
explain how the German nationalist institutions and organizations were transformed or sidelined 
by the Nazis for purposes of German expansion soon after their seizure of power.26 Jarowski 
approaches the issue as one of identity: whether the Sudeten Germans are outposts of German 
culture and ethnicity belonging to wider “Germandom” or whether they are an ethnic minority in 
Czechoslovakia, intended to integrate into wider Czechoslovak society and Czechoslovak state 
identity.27 Because Jarowski and Smesler focus on different decades, the 1920s and the 1930s 
respectively, links between their works are required to gauge the changes and continuities 
between the Weimar Republic and Nazi Germany as well as their impact on society.  
 Historians such as Eagle Glassheim and Mark Cornwall show a trend in recent years to 
produce studies of groups within the Sudeten German population in order to better understand 
                                                          
24 Radomír Luža, The Transfer of the Sudeten Germans (New York: New York University Press, 1964), 67-69.  
25 Bruegel, “Germans in Pre-War Czechoslovakia,” 178-179. 
26 Ronald M. Smelser, op.cit., 16-37. 
27 Rudolf Jarowski, Vorposten oder Minderheiten? Der sudetendeutsche Volkstumkampf in den Beziehungen 
zwischen der Weimarer Republik und der ČSR (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1975), 10-11. 
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how they developed during the 1920s and 1930s to become avid supporters of the SHF.28 
Glassheim’s short study of the Bohemian nobles after World War I and Cornwall’s biography of 
Sudeten German youth leader Heinz Rutha provide microcosms of Sudeten German 
development and quests for awareness, emerging far before the arrival of the Nazis into 
nationalistic dialogues and aspirations.29 These narratives, however, have yet to be united into a 
single study comparing the changes during the late 1920s and early 1930s. 
 Řepa also has added to the discourse on Sudeten German awareness through his 
exploration of historiography during the interwar period. Řepa argues that the Sudeten Germans 
actively built a new identity based on German nationhood after the collapse of the Hapsburg 
Empire. He then proceeds to detail the role Sudeten German historians in creating that identity, 
first writing on the history of arts and literature before branching into their role in the history of 
the German people.30 Řepa demonstrated how the intellectual elite of the Sudeten Germans 
helped create the Sudeten German perspective on other Germans and Germany, while leaving 
open questions as to how this historiography played out to an audience inside Germany.  
Patrick Crowhurst and Václav Houžvička represent the latest historians in the realm of 
Czechoslovakian history. Crowhurst accuses Czech historians of leaving the Sudeten Germans 
out of the history of Czechoslovakia and sees his goal as to restore them to a place as actors in 
the history of the First Czechoslovak Republic.31 Yet he focuses primarily on the older themes of 
economic displacement and the influence of the Nazi Party. Houžvička has taken a broader 
approach, exploring the issues from the context of the 1848 revolution to the present. He makes 
use of Louis de Jong’s study on the influence of ethnic German minorities in Germany to make 
                                                          
28 Eagle Glassheim,"The Birth of a Sudeten German Nobility, 1918-1938," The Germans and the East, ed. by Charles 
W. Ingrao, and Franz A. J. Szabo, 270-276. West Lafayette, IN: Purdue University Press.  
29 Cornwall, op. cit., 104-105.  
30 Řepa, op. cit., 309. 
31 Crowhurst, op. cit., 12-13. 
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his case for continuity between the Weimar Republic and Nazi Germany.32 While this approach 
provides the broadest understanding of the question, his study does not fully answer the question 
of how the Sudeten Germans played a role in their fate.  
The historiography has, for the most part, approached the question of awareness of the 
Sudeten Germans from the perspective of the history of Czechoslovakia or the approaching 
annexation. It is therefore worthwhile to study the documented and probable actions of the Nazi 
Party in isolation to determine their interest in Sudeten German awareness.  
 
Narratives in Germany: Kulturwehr 
 The dialogues in Germany were concentrated in publications and organizations 
concerned with minorities in Europe. One of these was the journal Kulturwehr, the “Institution of 
the Federation of National Minorities in Germany,” the most readily available and well-known 
forum concentrated solely on European minorities.33 The organization brought together Danish, 
Friesian, Lithuanian, Polish, and Sorbian minorities, and its journal reflected its diverse interests, 
with general articles on minority issues, articles pertaining to specific minorities in Germany as 
well as specific minorities in other European countries, relevant news articles from both German 
and foreign newspapers and magazines, and book reviews.  Originally started in 1925 as 
Kulturwille, the magazine changed its name and adopted its long-term organizational structure in 
1926. Graf Stanislaw von Sierakowski served as publisher. Described on the cover page as living 
at Groß Walpitz in East Prussia, Sierakowski was the first president of the Union of Poles in 
Germany, one of the founding organizations of the Federation.34 But the chief writer and editor 
                                                          
32 Houžvička, op. cit., 181-183.  
33 Original German title: Organ des Verbandes der nationalen Minderheiten Deutschlands. 
34 Peter Jan Joachim Kroh, Nationsozialistische Macht und nationale Minderheit: Jan Skala(1889-1945): Ein Sorb in 
Deutschland (Berlin: Kai Homilius Verlag, 2009), 204, fn.3.  
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of the magazine was Jan Skala, a member of the Sorb minority in eastern Germany.35 Skala 
engaged in a very public battle for the rights of minorities. He was taken to court in 1928 on 
defamation charges and he attempted to exercise his right to use the Sorbian (also known as 
Wendish) language in court.36 Skala’s activism and the background of the publishing 
organization precluded any association with German nationalism. Instead the journal presented 
an internationalist view to the German public and with an open minded nature to the issue of 
minorities in Europe, reflecting the diverse background of the organization’s supporters.  
 By 1929 Kulturwehr was publishing ten times a year and continued to follow the news of 
minorities in Europe. Articles on Czechoslovakia focused on German issues but also presented 
articles on Slovaks, Poles, Hungarians, and Jews.37 The seventh volume, published in 1931 
serves as a case in point. No less than fourteen articles appear in the table of contents, four in the 
June issue and four in the November issue. Eight of the articles concerned themselves 
specifically with the Germans. Yet two cover the Hungarian minority, while three could have 
been addressed to the minorities in Czechoslovakia as a whole. The June issue’s article “The 
Language Right after the Census of 1930,” an October article on “The Position of the National 
Minorities in the Czechoslovakia,” and an article in November concerning “The Anniversary 
Donation of President Masaryk.” This last article discussed how Masaryk was granted 20 million 
Czech crowns, which he divided into smaller amounts for “different cultural and philanthropic 
purposes,” with 2 million Czech crowns for “the German Society for Science and Art in 
                                                          
35 The Sorb minority has an independent language and history and existed primarily in Bohemia and eastern 
Germany. Today Jan Skala is one of the key heroes of that community for his resistance to the Nazi regime.  
36 Gerald Stone, Review of Nationalistische Macht und nationale Minderheit. Jan Skala (1889-1945): Eine Sorbe in 
Deutschland, by Peter Jan Joachim Kroh, The Slavonic and East European Review 89, no. 2 (April 2011): 364-365, 
accessed March 18, 2016, http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.5699/slaveasteurorev2.89.2.0364.  
37 Kulturwehr (1929), 6.  
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Czechoslovakia” as well as a million crown to create a similar Hungarian institution.38  The 
presentation of the Czech government sharply contrasted with the article on Sudeten German 
Nazis. In a section for excerpts from and analysis of other newspapers and journals, the writer 
begins “Sudeten German swastika men for a ‘Bloc of unliberated minorities’; that is the new 
slogan of the negativists!”39 Comparing the political parties and factions of the Sudeten German 
and German communities, the writer notes that the political factionalism among the Germans in 
Czechoslovakia is “very exactly the same many-sidedness like the party sample cards of 
neighboring Germany.” In other words, the division among Social Democrats, conservatives and 
National Socialists was similar to the greatly divided political identities in Germany. Believing 
the Sudeten German Nazis to be a weaker form of the party in Germany, the writer dismisses 
them, saying “on the whole really more amusing than dangerous.”40 The end of the article is 
marked “ska”, suggesting that Skala himself had written the article. Skala had a personal 
connection to Czechoslovakia, too, and had served as an antagonist to the Germans in Bohemia. 
He had participated in a sit-in at the Wendish Seminary in Prague in 1923, protesting the efforts 
of the Bishop of Messien to close the seminary as part of the efforts of Germanization.41 Skala 
was willing to risk challenging the right-wing extremists in order to promote democracy.  
What is also notable about the journal is the Roman font. Graf von Sierakowski would 
have spelled his first name Stanislaus in German, yet on the covers of Kulturwehr until 1932 his 
name was spelled in the Polish manner, Stanislaw. The same went for the spelling of 
Czechoslovakia. Kulturwehr would consistently (again, until 1932) spell the country’s name as 
                                                          
38 “Die Jubiläumsspende des Präsidenten Masaryk,“ Kulturwehr, vol. 7, no.11 (November 1931), 418.  
39 The original German title: “Sudetendeutsche Hakenkreuzler für einen “Block der unzufriedenen Minderheiten”; 
das ist die neueste Parole der Negativisten!” 
40 „Block der unzufriednen Minderheiten“, Kulturwehr, ed. by Jan Skala, 7, no. 6(Berlin: der Verband des National 
Minorities in Germany), 184.    
41 Stone, op. cit., 364. 
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“Čechoslovakei,” a German spelling that came closest to a Slavic spelling, requiring a caron. 
This symbol was unavailable in the German Fraktur calligraphic script.42 As Fraktur came to be 
used exclusively for German during the ninetheeth century, any author citing a text written by a 
Czech author or a Czech text would have to switch fonts in order to spell the name.43 This 
created a visual separation between Czech and German on the printed page, suggesting 
nationalistic differences and values. The accommodation of the German language with Czech 
spelling was more than convenience, but a political statement of independence from German 
intellectual nationalism.   
But in the next year represented a change. In 1932, the journal’s lead organization 
changed its name to Institution of the Federation of National Minorities in the German Reich.44 
Instead of its regular 10-issue publication schedule, the journal published quarterly during the 
year. While a great deal happened politically in Czechoslovakia, only three articles that year 
directly concerned Czechoslovakia and only one on the Germans.45 It is not clear what happened 
to Kulturwehr during this time, but the political crisis in Germany may have played a role in 
creating uncertainty at the organization. Changing the organization’s name to the traditional 
name for Germany, reminiscent of the Wilhelmian Empire and nationalistic ambitions, the new 
name might have been an effort to protect the organization from German conservatives and 
nationalists, particularly the Nazis, as they gained strength in the national government. That they 
did not seek protection from the Communists might show the conservatism of the members or a 
recognition of changing political winds.  
                                                          
42 Fraktur is a Gothic calligraphic script   
43 Tomasz Kamusella, "Central Europe from a Linguistic Viewpoint," Age of Globalization No. 2 (2010), 24. 
44 Original German name: Organ des Verbandes der nationalen Minderheiten des Deutschen Reiches 
45 “Inhaltsverzeichnis“, Kulturwehr, ed. by Jan Skala, 8 (Berlin: Verband der nationalen Minderheiten im Deutschen 
Reich, 1932).  
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 The Nazis, however, do not appear to have been convinced by the name change. 
Following the Nazi seizure of power in Germany, Kulturwehr did not publish between January 
and June of 1933. When the June issue was published, one of the first articles was a long 
summary by Jan Skala of recent events and a call for democracy, while the next article was about 
the Jewish plight in Upper Silesia.46 Skala had lost none of his courage in challenging the 
regime, but articles now discussed only German minority populations outside Germany. Jan 
Skala’s name began to appear as chief writer and the subtitle of the magazine changed from 
“Magazine for Minority Culture and Politic” to “Magazine for Nationality Questions.”47 
Czechoslovakia was the topic of fewer articles and now they concentrated solely on the German 
population.48 These changes from the pre-1933 topics suggest Jan Skala was under pressure from 
the Nazi Gleichschaltung in the press, forcing a concentration on issues of German minorities. 
The Nazi agenda had clearly singled out the Germans of Bohemia as being worthy of 
concentration.  
 The Gleichschaltung appeared in stages.49 Hitler issued a decree requiring coordination 
of all activities in the Third Reich on June 30, 1933. Specifically for the Ministry of the Interior, 
he granted jurisdiction over “General public enlightenment on the domestic scene…the 
press…the radio, the German Library in Leipzig, Art, Music…, Theater, Cinema….” References 
to this new policy had already appeared in a speech by Goebbels in the Reichsgesetztblatt on 
                                                          
46 Jan Skala, “Nationale Revolution—Nationale Minderheiten,” Kulturwehr, ed. by Jan Skala, 9, no.1 (Berlin: 
Verband der deutschen Minderheitenkultur und –Politik, 1933), 3-11; “Die Beschwerde der jüdische Minderheit 
Preussich-Oberschliesens vor dem Völkerbund“, Kulturwehr ed. by Jan Skala, 9, no.1 (Berlin: Verband der 
deutschen Minderheitenkultur und –Politik, 1933), 11.  
47 Original German name: Zeitschrift für Minderheitenkultur und –Politik; Zeitschrift für Volkstumsfragen  
48 “Inhaltverzeichnis,“ Kulturwehr, ed. by Jan Skala, 9, no.1 (Berlin: Verband der deutschen Minderheitenkultur und 
–Politik, 1933). 
49 Gleichschaltung is the official term for the coordination of all activities in Germany under the control of the 
NSDAP after the Nazi seizure of power in 1933.  
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April 11, 1933.50 This would suggest that Hitler wished to place emphasis on the act and its role 
in reshaping Germany to meet his vision for the new German Reich. Later in October, the role of 
editors in the new regime was clarified by the Editor’s Law.51 Under the section titled “Editor’s 
Profession,” the law stated:52  
Those in the main occupation or for the reason of appointment to chief editor carry on 
contribution on the creation of intellectual content of in Reich territory edited newspapers 
and political journals through word, message or image is one in the professional 
obligation and right of the state regulated published editions through this law. Those 
responsible are called editors. No one may call themselves an editor who after this law is 
not authorized for that purpose.53  
 
 The law went further to state that the editors were under the jurisdiction of the Reich Minister 
for Public Enlightenment and Propaganda, Josef Goebbels. The law also strictly stated in 
“”Licensing to the Editor’s Profession”: 
   §5.1. who possess German membership in the Reich, 
        2. who have not lost civic rights and the ability to wear public office 
        3. is of Aryan descent and is not married to a person of non-Aryan 
descent…54 
 
That Jan Skala continued to publish Kulturwehr until 1938 leads to several conclusions about his 
actions. He quite possibly continued to publish despite pressure from the state, boldly declaring 
his defiance as he published his name as chief editor on the cover of the 1935 volumes of his 
journal. The state might not have been able to fully enforce the law and could not punish him 
immediately or it allowed some form of accommodation despite his Slavic roots. Perhaps Skala 
himself chose to limit his outspokenness and maintain the semblance of legality to allow the 
journal to continue to operate. Whatever the case, it seems highly unlikely that the Sorb, who 
                                                          
50 “Hitler’s Decree for the Gleichschaltung (Coordination) of All Activities in the Third Reich, June 30, 1933,”Hitler’s 
Third Reich: A Documentary History, ed. by Louis L. Snyder, (Chicago: Nelson, 1988),129-130.  
51 Original German name: Schriftleitergesetz  
52 Original German name: Schriftleiterberuf 
53 “Schriftleitergesetz vom 4. Oktober 1933,” Der Nationalsozialismus: Dokumente 1933-1945, edited by Walter 
Hofer (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer Bücherei, 1957), 90.  
54 Ibid., 91.  
Siegel 21 
 
publicly protested Germanization in Czechoslovakia, would of his own free will publish in the 
July-August 1935 edition the speech of Konrad Henlein to his voters after the SdP’s successful 
Czech Parliament election in May 1935, in which he declared “The people have decided, the idea 
of the people’s community has won!”55 Somehow the voice for the defenseless minorities of 
Germany had begun publishing the speeches of German nationalists.  
 
German Narratives: The Encyclopedias 
 The effects of bringing newspapers and journals under direct Nazi government control 
may be seen in more than a cultural magazine that had already tread close to the edge of legality 
during the Weimar Republic. The seventh edition of the Meyers Lexicon, an encyclopedia 
published by the Bibliographisches Institut in Leipzig, had its first volume published in 1924, 
and in 1929 the eleventh volume was released with the definition for “Sudeten,” 
“Sudetendeutschtum,” and “Sudetenländer.” The first referred to the mountains of “lower, upper 
Silesia, and Czechoslovakia (Bohemia, Moravia, and former Austrian Silesia.” The population is 
described as being “predominately German, on the south side also Czech (density 100 to 150 per 
square kilometer) operate mixed farming, forestry, wool, cotton, linen weaving mills, produces 
glass and porcelain. The chief industry areas are the coal fields of Waldenburg and Schatzlar.” 
Sudetendeutschtum is defined as “the old Austrian designation for Deutschtum in the 
Sudetenlands of Bohemia, Moravia, and Silesia, since 1919 for the Deutschtum of the whole of 
Czechoslovakia.” The citation referenced Deutschtum abroad in its suggestions for further 
reading. The Sudetenländer definition is even shorter: “new name for the former Austrian crown 
                                                          
55 “Aufruf Henleins an der Wähler der ‘Sudetendeutsche Partei,’” Kulturwehr, ed. by Jan Skala, vol. 10, July-August 
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lands of Bohemia, Moravia, and Silesia, having a share of the Sudetens.”56 This definition gives 
at best limited emphasis to the region and even further limited reference to the Sudeten Germans 
themselves, going into little explanation of the region. 
The same year F.A. Brockhaus in Leipzig released the second volume of its new updated 
lexicon, to replace the edition written in the late 1890s. The city of Aussig, located in Bohemia 
north of Prague, was included. It was described as the “administrative center of the political 
district of Aussig,” the region having a population of 117,840, mostly Germans, and the city 
itself being the second largest city in “German Bohemia” with a population of 39,830, of which 
30,850 were German.57 The description goes on to talk about the city’s role as the “the most 
significant transportation hub of North Bohemia, the busiest port in Bohemia and the Elbe until 
Hamburg, the most significant transfer site in Czechoslovakia for soft coal, sugar, chemicals, 
fruit.”58 While entries such as this explain the significance of this industrial Sudeten German 
city, the dominance of the German population, and show a geographical connection to a major 
German city, it does not appear to reflect a specific agenda. Despite Sudetenland becoming a 
popular description for the region by this time, the term is not used, and neither are the city’s 
inhabitants referred to as Sudeten Germans. Instead the more historical term of German Bohemia 
appears. The editors also appear to show no qualms about referring to the city’s significance to 
Czechoslovakia, nor seek to deny Czechoslovak claims to it. Later on in the description, no 
reference is made to the formation of Czechoslovakia as being significant to the city’s history, 
and all works referenced predate the First World War and were written in German.59 The 
description is thus conservative, avoiding mentioning recent political struggles, emphasizing a 
                                                          
56 Meyers Lexicon, 7th ed., vol. 11, (Leipzig: Bibliographisches Institute, 1924), 1114. 
57Original name: Deutschböhmen  
58 Der Große Brockhaus, 2nd ed., vol. 2 (Leipzig: F.A. Brockhaus, 1929), 117 .  
59 Ibid., 117. 
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predominant role for the Germans without calling for German ethnic unity either within 
Czechoslovakia or to the German state. . 
By 1934, when the nineteenth volume of Der Große Brockhaus was published, the 
picture has changed. Two maps show Czechoslovakia without mentioning it by name. Maps 56 
and 56a, show the “Sudeten- und Karpathenländer,” the first concentrating on the geology, the 
second on tectonic plates.60 These maps are scientific, concentrating on these geographical 
features rather than politics. Prague is relegated to the top right corner, excluding western 
Bohemia entirely, while the Hungarian capital of Budapest lies closer to the center. Map 56b 
follows the same geographic parameters but concerns itself with the “natural resources” of the 
region. This time the borders are marked, seeming to emphasize the petroleum fields of eastern 
Czechoslovakia and central Romania. But map 57a shows a different understanding of the 
region. Referring now to the industry of Bohemia, Moravia, and Czech-Silesia, it focuses on the 
industries that predominantly relate to Sudeten Germans: glass, porcelain, chemicals, and 
textiles. The orange shading, however, reflects this economic map in an ethnic perspective, 
showing the “German settlement areas,” extending over the borders of the German Reich and 
Austria into Czechoslovakia, blurring the political borders.61 It represents more than a claim to 
the economic and cultural prowess of the Sudeten Germans. The map lays claim to the Sudeten 
Germans as having a place in Deutschtum and, perhaps, in a greater Germany.  
The entries that follow in Das Große Brockahus volume show the change yet more 
starkly. Gone are references to Sudetendeutschtum. “Sudeten,” filling a nearly a full page in the 
Meyer’s Encyclopedia just five years earlier, now is reduced to less than half a page. The other 
half-page is taken up by “Sudetendeutsche,” the “collective name of Germans living in the 
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61 Deutsche Siedlungsgebiete; Das Große Brockhaus, 2nd ed., vol. 19 (Leipzig: F.A. Brockhaus, 1934), 128-129 .  
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Sudetenlands, some 3.3 million.” The description identifies the Germans living Bohemia and 
Moravia not to a broader group of ethnic Germans living both inside and outside the Reich, to 
the universal Deutschtum. Instead they are their own independent ethnic group within 
Czechoslovakia connected to Germany by ethnicity.62  It goes on to explain that “[they] 
themselves belong tribally moderate after speech, convention, and fashion” to distinct areas: the 
Böhmerwald, Egerland, and the “language islands” in Silesia. It also claims that “the Sudeten 
Germans came into the country in the general line of the East-Middle German colonialization, 
primarily since the twelfth century.” It makes reference to their place in the Volksstum and the 
variety of organizations the Sudeten Germans formed, including some from the 1920s.63 Unlike 
Meyers Lexicon, the literature cited is recent and the authors are Sudeten German. Emil 
Lehmann, one of the authors cited, was also a frequent contributor to another source listed, the 
Sudetendeutsches Jahrbuch, a Sudeten German publication printed in Eger in western Bohemia 
as well as in Munich.64 The writers of Das Große Brockhaus deferred to the writings of the 
Sudeten Germans themselves in seeking to describe them.  
Other entries also reflect the change in the “Sudetendeutsche” entry. “Sudetendetusche 
Heimatfront,” “Sudetendeutscher Landbund,” and the “Sudetenländer” focus on specific Sudeten 
German organizations and identify a Sudeten German geographical area. Of the three, perhaps 
most surprising is the Sudetendeutsche Heimatsfront (SHF), which, as the entry notes, had only 
been founded the year before the publication of the volume, on October 1, 1933. The SHF is 
called “the political movement of the young Sudeten German generation.”65 What it does not 
mention is the organization also absorbed remnants of the German National Socialist Workers’ 
                                                          
62 “Abroad;” the term for Germans living in border regions is Grenzlanddeutsche.  
63 Das Große Brockhaus, 2nd ed., vol. 19 (Leipzig: F.A. Brockhaus, 1934), 324.  
64 Original German title: Sudeten German Yearbook 
65Das Große Brockhaus, 2nd ed., vol. 19 (Leipzig: F.A. Brockhaus, 1934), 325.  
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Party (DNSAP). Transnational Nazi Party influence and Sudeten German nationalism had 
collided in the Das Große Brockhaus entry. 
The influence of the Nazi Party after a time shaped the awareness in Germany of the 
Sudeten Germans. The sudden rise in references to the Sudeten Germans and their interests 
appears more than an accidental move, showing a close correlation between the publication date 
and the coordination of German cultural life under the Nazi regime. What is also clear, however, 
is that Sudeten German speeches and texts are now available in Germany and are in scholarly use 
for understanding the German minority group. This would suggest an inordinate interest by Nazi 
censors in the nationalistic opinions of Sudeten Germans. What the opinions of two German 
officials on both sides of the Czechoslovak border would show, however, was that Nazi interest 
was both nuanced and constrained.  
Nazi Party: A Transnational Influence before 1933 
 “Straight to Prague, where tonight I speak before the students,” Joseph Goebbels wrote in 
his diary on February 3, 1930. “Hopefully they will not arrest me. Nothing is to be put past the 
Czechs.”66 Goebbels was visiting Prague at the invitation of the university Volkssport, the youth 
movement of the DNSAP.67 While officially the party was not connected to the Nazi Party in 
Germany and officially pledged loyalty to the Czechoslovak state, Goebbels’s invitation and 
participation in Prague showed the party’s true affiliation. Goebbels’s visit also reflected how the 
Nazi Party and one of its most prominent leaders was aware of the Sudeten Germans.  
 The DNSAP had long ties to German politics and Hitler’s movement. Rudolf Jung, an 
engineer and a leader of the DNSAP, wrote a book published in Aussig in 1919 called National 
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Socialism: its Basis, its History, and its Goal.68 In 1922 the book was republished in “revamped” 
form in Germany. Jung, who is described on the cover as “Deputy, Member of the Prague 
House” or deputy in the Czechoslovak Parliament in this edition, held many of the key tenants of 
the Hitler movement in Germany: the racial conflict between Germans and Jews, the Jewish 
roots of Marxism and the racial betrayal by socialists of their German roots. In response to these 
threats, on March 20, 1920, at Salzburg in Austria, “National Socialists in German Austria, the 
German Reich, and Czechoslovakia” united to become the “National Socialist Party of the 
German People.”69 Jung quotes a speech at the “constitutional convention of German Austria” 
delivered on October 21, 1918, by Deputy Hans Knirsch: “Only in a united German state could 
we Germans of the Eastern Marches hope for the realization of every basic principle of state 
socialism, which will heal the wounds of this war and lead our eighty million people of work and 
activity towards a happy future. Long live a free, social All-Germany!”70 For the Sudeten 
German National Socialists, the ideology of National Socialism offered an agenda that would 
unite the German regions of Czechoslovakia with a greater Germany. This plea appears to have 
found an audience in Germany: the publisher was the Deutscher Volksverlag in Munich. Jung’s 
National Socialism would have found a home in the nationalistic atmosphere of Bavaria on the 
eve of Hitler’s Beer Hall Putsch.  
 By the 1930, both Jung and Knirsch were leaders of a changed and sophisticated DNSAP. 
During the 1920s, the DNSAP, like its fellow nationalist party, the German National Party 
(DNP), had opted to participate in parliamentary politics, while criticizing those German 
                                                          
68 Original title: Der nationale Sozialismus: Seine Grundlage, sein Werdegang, und sein Ziel. 
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“activist” parties who already had without demanding conditions for German autonomy.71 
Knirsch had joined Jung in the Czechoslovak Parliament as a representative, holding one of 
fifteen seats by the time the DNSAP was dissolved in 1933.72 The DNSAP, like many of the 
political parties at that time, was also running a youth organization, the Volkssport (People’s 
Sport).73 When registered in April 1929 with the Czechoslovak government, the Volkssport 
claimed to be a German cultural organization, devoted to outdoor activities. Steadily, however, 
the movement adopted the SA uniform and became increasingly militant.74 It was this proto-Nazi 
Party in Czechoslovakia that invited Goebbels to talk to their organization. 
 Goebbels was not yet the master of propaganda that he would become. In February 1930, 
he was the Berlin Gauleiter and editor of the paper Der Angriff, a weekly propaganda paper.75 A 
protracted dispute with the Nazi leaders Otto and Gregor Strasser brothers had prevented 
Goebbels from expanding his newspaper into a daily.76 Around this time Goebbels scored a 
propaganda bonanza with the death of Horst Wessel, a young Berlin SA leader fatally injured by 
local Communists in a rent dispute. Using Wessel’s agonizing death and the song he had written 
called “Die Fahne hoch,” (Raise high the flag), Goebbels made Wessel into a badly needed 
martyr. The funeral on March 1, 1930, would begin a myth of Nazi courage and sacrifice.77  An 
ambitious and prominent leader with an eye for utilizing events to his own advantage, Goebbels 
would be the perfect person to be made aware of the Sudeten Germans and their issues. 
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 Goebbels’s reactions to the situation in Czechoslovakia is one that reflected the cautious 
attitude the Nazi Party in Germany took towards their Sudeten German compatriots. Arriving in 
Prague on the afternoon of the speech, he talked briefly with the students--“orderly young 
men…they are very ardent”—before taking a pre-speech nap. “Overflowing hall. A powerful 
success. An ostentatious approval.” The Czech authorities ended the demonstration when two 
Jewish protestors interrupted the end of the speech and were ejected. “A fine pre-arranged game! 
Great commotion. Our chairman was well not aware to the situation.”78 Goebbels had fought 
street battles and protests in unruly “red” Berlin before this outburst.79 The situation played well 
to his prejudices: Jewish collaboration with an oppressive Slavic government ruling over 
Germans, trampling their rights of free speech. He criticized the organization of the event that 
did not prevent the counterdemonstration in the first place. Goebbels expected discipline from 
the Sudeten German Nazis as he expected it of his Nazi forces at home in Berlin.  
 Goebbels made no mention of spending the night in Prague but instead appears to have 
left almost immediately after the interrupted rally. Before he did, he met with Deputy Knirsch “a 
calm, fine, trim and appeared to me as a capable man.” Goebbels did not remark on anything 
passing between them in the way of instructions or advice. On the train ride home Goebbels also 
met with another DNSAP leader, “Deputy [Rudolf] Kasper. An intelligent worker. Told me a 
great deal about our Sudeten German movement.” Summing up, Goebbels comments, “The head 
is probably Knirsch and Jung, who…make the outward appearance. A little sloppiness and 
podsnappery is also well present.”80 Goebbels did not attempt to stay on longer and help the 
Sudeten Germans organize themselves; he was more concerned about performing the task of an 
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observer and envoy of the Nazi message. He was now leaving out of personal self-interest in his 
own security.  
 Goebbels does deign to make comments about what he has seen in the context of the 
great Nazi struggle against the Slavic races. He admitted earlier that when he first arrived in the 
city “of Prague I saw only less.”  But he still has seen enough to conclude that the situation is 
part of a pattern. “That was a look at the German minority problem,” he begins. 
 The Germans build the cultures, and then the uncreative parasites diminish them. 
Prague is a German city, and the Germans therein still only suffer. How German it is, it 
appeared to me on a carriage excursion—there is still have [carriage rides] there—to the 
gathering. About Wenceslas Square. Laid out very German. But with Czech signs. 
Disgusting! Had the German always in the past had so much powerful political will, as 
they had culture, we would today be rulers of Europe, perhaps even the world.81 
  
Goebbels’s world view is on full display. He places what he sees in Prague into the context of a 
wider German struggle for supremacy against inferior nations and races. His reaction to the 
carriage ride is one of urbanity taking note of provincial attitudes. For Goebbels, the Sudeten 
Germans are one of many German groups part of the larger struggle of Germans against the 
inferior races, part of the wider Nazi struggle to gain supremacy in Europe.  
  
The Ambassador’s Dilemma: Official Awareness after the Seizure of Power 
 Dr. Walter Koch, the German ambassador in Czechoslovakia, sent a message to the 
Foreign Ministry on October 10, 1933 to summarize the events of the preceding days. Entitled 
“Situation of the Sudeten Germans,” Dr. Koch detailed the dissolution of the DNSAP and the 
DNP that he had previously reported on October 5, the collapse of plans for a “Popular Front” 
and a “People’s Council,” and Henlein’s efforts to save the newly formed SHF from Czech 
persecution. When noting the terror of the Sudeten German population towards the Czech 
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crackdown on all organizations with any affiliation to the Nazis, Dr. Koch also remarked on the 
Sudeten German attitude towards the Germans. “On the Sudeten German side,” he noted to his 
superiors in Berlin, “there is, moreover, the feeling that all that has been going on has not made a 
sufficiently deep impression on the Reich German public and press and that no help is to be 
expected from Germany. The rather indiscriminate nervousness…with which the Czech 
authorities carry out their measures, increases the general insecurity even more.”82 This 
perspective of the Sudeten German community reflects not only an awareness of German 
attitudes towards them, but how Sudeten German awareness in Germany or lack thereof could 
affect the morale of Sudeten Germans.  
 In the wake of Hitler’s election in Germany, the Czechoslovak government elevated their 
prosecution of the Sudeten German Nazis on charges of treason and colluding with a foreign 
power. Already having plans to prosecute the Nazi Deputies in the Czechoslovak Parliament 
when their parliamentary immunity expired, the Czechoslovak government now sought to reduce 
any attempt to challenge the authority of the state. A first response was the passing of a state of 
emergency on June 9th, giving the government the ability to pursue the DNSAP and the DNP 
more thoroughly.83 New press laws had already resulted in bans on ninety-eight Reich German 
newspapers, preventing Sudeten Germans from receiving news or propaganda from Germany.84 
Trials against Sudeten Germans and Reich Germans in the western Bohemian town of Asch 
proceeded on charges of participating in Nazi rallies in Germany before the German Reichstag 
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elections in March.85 The rigorous Czech offensive was posing a threat not just to Sudeten 
German Nazis but to Reich Germans living in Czechoslovakia.86 
 All of this posed a particularly difficult dilemma for Dr. Koch. He was not, as Crowhurst 
claimed, a career diplomat in the sense that he had emerged from the civil service at the 
Auswärtiges Amt, but a National Liberal politician appointed in 1921 as Minister in 
Czechoslovakia and who continued to serve until 1935. J.W. Brügel describes him as having 
“extraordinary knowledge of the Czech political situation and a shrewd power of analysis with 
no trace of a pro-Czech attitude….”87 This judgement suggests that Dr. Koch is a mostly neutral 
but strong observer of events in Czechoslovakia. He had thoroughly condemned the efforts of 
Sudeten German nationalists in the 1920s and urged Berlin to do so as well, even receiving 
support from the influential Foreign Minister Gustav Stresemann for his views, while welcoming 
the move by German activist parties to join the Czechoslovak government in 1926.88 Dr. Koch 
was also no friend of the Czechoslovak Foreign Minister Beněs, although his personal 
relationship apparently had no influence on the policies of the German government.89 Dr. Koch, 
in other words, was an influential voice in the German Foreign Ministry who did not follow the 
nationalist line.  
 It is from this professional and political standpoint that Dr. Koch, while probably 
disguising his true political colors, gave cautious advice to the new Nazi government on how to 
proceed.  In a December report on possibly giving financial support to those connected with the 
now-defunct DNSAP, he recommended that only financial support could be given, and carefully, 
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as the Czechs would most likely retaliate against the Sudeten Germans in prison. The financial 
aid could also only be given through trusted men, whose names Dr. Koch felt comfortable in 
passing along through the official message itself, as well as relying exclusively on the “the party 
and trusted members.”90 This is the cautious advice of a diplomat attempting to help Sudeten 
Germans without embarrassing his country in a difficult political time.  
 Yet there is also a sense that Dr. Koch is aware of other discourses in the Sudeten 
German community, rather than just the single viewpoint of the DNSAP or the Nazi regime 
across the border. His diplomatic note on June 19 mentions that the measures taken against the 
nationalists “not only find approval of the German Government parties; it is also noticeable that 
German opposition parties like the Christian Social party or the Labor and Economy Group do 
not oppose this legislation with any elementary resistance, but merely display a lame sort of 
opposition.”91 The rest of the Sudeten German political community is tacitly united behind the 
suppression, suggesting that the terror Dr. Koch describes later either reflects that these parties 
lack popular support among the Sudeten Germans or that the Sudeten German community itself 
was divided on supporting the Nazis. His awareness of this strained political situation would 
suggest that official German awareness realized that the Nazis lacked full support in 
Czechoslovakia as did the German political opposition.  
 Dr. Koch also takes particular exception to plans against the German University in 
Prague. With some disgust he writes “[the Czechs] are even considering converting the 
University from a German one into a university for all national minorities of the state (thus 
including Jews and Hungarians). In this way any element of a consciously German character of 
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the University would be finished for good.”92 A cultural awareness and protectiveness seems to 
make Dr. Koch particularly protective of the university.  
 The Foreign Ministry appears to have concurred with Dr. Koch, both on a practical and 
nationalistic level in regards to the plight of the Sudeten Germans. A message sent to Dr. Koch 
on November 23 set forth the policy that “both sides should strive at least to normalize again the 
outward relations of Czechoslovakia as soon as possible.” When dealing with the arrests both in 
Czechoslovakia and the retaliatory arrests in Germany of Czechoslovak citizens, the Foreign 
Ministry asked Dr. Koch to request from the Czechoslovak government “a list of the Reich 
German citizens sentenced in Czechoslovakia since the revolution; this list would also have to 
contain in detail the offenses charged against them and their punishments.” 93 The concern of the 
Foreign Ministry was thus the well-being of German-Czech relations on an international level 
and the protection of citizens of Germany. The Sudeten Germans were taking second place when 
it came to considerations of all Germans.  
 The Nazi government, with these priorities in mind, also began to move to coordinate 
their policy towards the Sudeten Germans. The Volksdeutsch Council (VR) member Dr. 
Steinacher in a meeting with the Foreign Ministry, began to take full control of the Sudeten 
German issue for the German government.94 The reading of the situation, given by Dr. 
Steinacher, stated that they would be unable to help organized Nazi Party institutions in 
Czechoslovakia and “For years the Sudeten Germans would have to hold out by their own 
strength.”95 All further questions as to the Sudeten German policy would be directed to the VR. 
As a final recommendation “it was too made clear once again that there was a general ban 
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applying to all party authorities on activities outside the borders of the Reich in foreign countries, 
and also that on principle Germans abroad were not to be admitted to the SA and the Labor 
Service.”96 The Nazi government had made a double-move: by stepping in through the VR, the 
Nazi government gained more direct control over assisting the Sudeten Germans; at the same 
time, official Nazi policy put distance between Germany and the Sudeten German Nazis to await 
a better opportunity.  
 
 
Abroad Organizations: An Overview 
 While the VR was a recent organization for German government to use towards greater 
control over Germans abroad in general, Steinacher and his organization, the Association for 
Deutschtum Abroad (VDA), was not.97 Originally founded in 1881 as an association specializing 
in founding schools for German ethnic communities outside the German Reich, it had expanded 
after 1918 into a cultural and political organization with representatives in twenty-seven 
countries. After 1933, the Nazis created a more official role for the VDA. Dr. Steinacher, a 
German nationalist with a reputation as a fighter for German minorities everywhere, was made 
leader in April of 1933 and the VDA changed from an association to a People’s Federation, a 
term more popular for German nationalistic aspirations.98 Steinacher was not someone who fully 
followed the Nazi Party line; he was frustrated with Hitler’s focus on Germany alone and would 
lose his position in 1937 when he opposed Hitler on leaving South Tirol and its German 
population under Italian rule.99 Differences in opinion, however, do not appear to have been of 
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too great a concern to the Nazi government in 1933, when Rudolf Hess, a longtime associate of 
Hitler and already Deputy to the Führer, took charge of all issues relating to Germans beyond 
Germany’s borders, announcing the creation of the VR under a Munich university professor Dr. 
Haushofer. Hess gave Steinacher “primary responsibility for representing the Volksdeutsch 
Council abroad.” A clause of this order also made the organization secret.100 
 It is beyond the scope and purpose of this paper to explore the issues of all German 
nationalistic organizations in Germany as well as to explore fully how these organizations and 
their awareness of the Sudeten Germans changed during this period.101 It is, however, 
worthwhile showing that the Nazi Gleichschaltung brought changes to all organizations dealing 
with the Germans abroad. The VR had emerged from talks involving the VDA as well as the 
German Protection Federation, the German Foreign Institute and the German Academy.102 
Personal connections among the leadership and a desire to promote centralization led to the 
creation of the VR.103 This ultimately meant turning their educational and cultural institutions 
into a tool for the Nazi Party.  
 Sudeten German organizations in Germany, however, were sidelined. One example is the 
Sudeten German Homeland Federation (SHB), formed from Sudeten German refugees and 
becoming a militant organization running rallies calling for the secession of the Sudeten 
Germans from Czechoslovakia. In 1933, the SHB attempted to expand in coordination with the 
Federation of the German East (BdO) and benefitted from the flight of Hans Krebs, one of the 
leaders of the DNSAP in Czechoslovakia. The movement, however, when found to be out of line 
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with the VR, was reduced in access to political power by Hess. The SHB and other Sudeten 
Germans would carry on but as a “nuisance.”104 Organizations that did not fit the narrative 
promoted by the Nazi Party were kept from the planning rooms that would decide the fate of 
their communities in Czechoslovakia. 
 
 
 
Conclusion: A Controlled Narrative 
 In 1935 two German cigarette companies, collaborated on making a cigarette card album. 
Announcing in their forward that their inspiration had come from the recent plebiscite in the 
Saarland that had returned the region in western Germany to formal German governance, the 
patriotic corporations sought to both remind and celebrate the events of the past fifteen years. 
The album gave places for the consumer to paste the cigarette cards with images from each 
month from the events of the November Revolution of 1918 to January 1935, along with 
descriptions of the events of that month on the opposite side. The album reflects a Nazi 
propaganda outlook: no mention is made of defeats along the Western Front in 1918 and the 
murder of Ernst Röhm and the leadership of the SA by Himmler and the SS in the Night of the 
Long Knives on June 30, 1934 is cast as a foiled coup and the picture for June 1934 is of 
Goebbels’s negotiations with Poland.105  
 The Sudeten Germans are not mentioned for much of the album until November 1934, 
when two events are noted. The first is the order of a German court in Eger to conduct business 
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only in German and clashes between German and Czech students in Prague.106 The second was 
the yielding of the German University to demands by the Czech government to turn over its old 
insignia.107 The timing and choice of events appears strange. These are not events that appear to 
have stood out to contemporaries and are not singled out by many of the histories written later as 
particularly significant to Sudeten Germans.  
 Yet the choice suggests an insight into what had happened to Sudeten German awareness 
in Germany by 1935. With Henlein leading his SdP into the elections, the Nazi government felt 
comfortable covertly providing funds to the election campaign.108 The SdP’s victory that year 
turned the party into the largest single party in the Czechoslovak Parliament.109 With a willing 
and powerful ally in Czechoslovakia, the Nazi government may have finally felt willing to give 
the Sudeten Germans greater focus in its propaganda.  
 The propaganda album also shows a selective view of history. Without any mention of 
the trials and tribulations of the Sudeten Germans during the 1920s and early 1930s, it might 
appear to an uninformed reader that oppression of the Sudeten Germans had only just begun. 
Like the references to the SHF in Das Große Brockhaus and the republishing of Henlein’s 
triumphant speeches in the formerly independent Kulturwehr, the appearance of the Sudeten 
Germans in popular literature appears deliberate and engineered to bring the Sudeten Germans to 
the popular conscience. Coming at a moment when Nazi censors controlled the information 
within Germany and Czech restrictions, along with the strength of SdP, controlled what is 
coming out of Czechoslovakia, the Nazis were now fully in charge of the dialogue about Sudeten 
                                                          
106 Ibid., 95. 
107 Ibid., 95-96. 
108 Crowhurst, op. cit., 113.   
109 Crowhurst, op. cit.,  123. 
Siegel 38 
 
German awareness both at home and, mostly, abroad. It would allow them to sharpen a message 
leading to the annexation in 1938.  
 The annexation resulted in the short-lived Second Czechoslovak Republic. On March 15, 
1939, Nazi Germany occupied what remained of Bohemia and Moravia, putting Czechs under 
German occupation for much of the war.110 After the war, a newly liberated Czechoslovakia 
expelled the Sudeten Germans, sending most of the population into the Allied occupation zones 
in Germany and Austria. The lingering resentment and hostility between Czechs and Sudeten 
Germans would continue into the Cold War.111 But as the events of 1929-1934 show, the 
Sudeten German awareness had been a forced issue, especially within Germany. Ultimately, it 
was the Nazi control of the press and their ambivalence towards directly helping the Sudeten 
Germans that shaped the evolution of more diverse and open discourses about the Sudeten 
Germans into a more controlled narrative that reflected the priorities of the Nazi state. In such 
circumstances, the Nazis were building from little long-term public support and from an 
inconsistent for annexing the Sudeten Germans. When public opinion failed to back a war over 
the Czechoslovakia, it showed that controlling public perception of the Sudeten Germans could 
not sway public perception itself.  
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